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Epub ☆ Chinas War with Japan 1937 1945 í 480 pages Download Ç Helpyouantib ✓ ☀ Chinas War with Japan 1937 1945 PDF / Epub ✍ Author Rana Mitter – Helpyouantib.co.uk In Rana Mitter's tense moving and hugely important book the war between China and Japan one of the mRecreate this terrible conflict He writes both about the major leaders Chiang Kaishek Mao Zedong and Wang Jingwei and about the ordinary people swept up by terrible times Mitter puts at the heart of our understanding of the Second World War that it was Japan's failure to defeat China which was the key dynamic for what happened in As This book was both an enlightening and a depressing experience to read enlightening because I learned much I did not know before of this phase of the World War II theatre and depressing because Mr Mitter’s narrative vividly portrays the continuously unfolding horrors visited upon the Chinese people during these years While I have been aware since my graduate student days of the multiple millions of deaths suffered by the Russian people during World War II I was stunned to learn that upwards of 20 million Chinese died as a conseuence of Japanese attempts to subdue China Accordingly I wish this book could be reuired reading in the United States as it would significantly assist American citizens to understand the remarkable progress made by China in a very short time as well as the ongoing dynamics of the tensions between China and Japan I certainly better appreciate why Chinese leadership and the people of China are so uick to bristle at any evidence that Japan is moving towards once again emphasizing “national patriotism” while concurrently seeking to alter the pacifistic Constitution imposed upon Japan by the Americans following the end of WW II I am also deeply alarmed at these developments Mr Mitter also does a very good job illustrating the complexity of Chinese domestic politics during the long period following the sad denouement of Sun Yat Sen’s revolution including the post World War II armed struggle in China between Mao Zedong’s Communist forces and the conservative armies of the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai shek following the defeat of Japan While it is clear that both men played a crucial role in defending China against the Japanese I see how difficult it must be for the Chinese people on the one hand to balance acknowledging that the Nationalist troops valiantly fought against the Japanese invaders while on the other to appropriately honoring the critical importance that Mao’s vision and force of personality played in ultimately unifying China and creating the groundwork for the resurgent China of the 21st Century For in my own country over 150 years since the outbreak of our own civil war in the mid 19th Century Americans continue to obsess in assessing interpreting and differing over the causes behind and the meaning of this pivotal period As a conseuence passions still flare up occasionally between Northerners and Southerners and the poison of centuries of discrimination against black people still distorts our civil discourse This book could also provide the West with much needed perspective on the complicated history of Chinese Western inter relationships China’s ongoing suspicions of the West’s intentions have their roots in an unsavory past in which the West regularly interfered with China treating its ancient culture with insulting disrespect If today’s Chinese government occasionally strikes some in the West as being “overly assertive” this may be in part because we still subconsciously expect China to “remember its place” and to maintain its former deference to Western powers While as an historian I was aware of the shameful way China had been repeatedly treated throughout the 19th century by Western powers I did not realize before reading this book how poorly China was often treated even as an ally of the Western powers during World War II The following passage from Forgotten Ally pp 243 44 provides but one example The problem was that the Chinese and the Westerners looked at China’s role through almost entirely different lenses To the Western Allies China was a supplicant a battered nation on its knees waiting for the Americans and British to save it from certain destruction at the hands of the Japanese In Chiang’s view and that of many Chinese their country was the first and most consistent foe of Axis aggression Despite numerous opportunities to withdraw from the conflict China had fought on when the prospects of outside assistance seemed hopeless and it now deserved to be treated as an eual power The United States itself waxed warm and cool towards China in the ‘30s and ‘40s On the one hand President Roosevelt was personally sympathetic to the Chinese and despite British concerns over implications that a strong China might have for its still extensive colonial holdings in Southeast Asia he strongly supported a role for China as an eual However the figure sent by America to act as the principal liaison between the US and China – General Joseph Stilwell – repeatedly clashed with Chiang Kai shek placing his own judgment as to the appropriate use of Chinese troops before those of the Chinese leader He even came to despise Kai shek referring to him privately as “the Peanut” In reading about Stilwell I often winced for he seemed to embody one of the types of “ugly Americans” who have so often annoyed other cultures –an arrogant self righteous individual who was unaware that he was in fact not nearly as bright as he thought he was Despite the difficulties Stilwell caused the over all American reaction to Mao initially ranged from neutral to positive Of course the fact that he was a Communist rattled many cages in Washington but his clarity of purpose demonstrated organizational skills and obvious concern for the peasantry near his organizational headuarters in Yan’an made a very positive impression upon several American visitors civilian and military alike In contrast while Chiang Kai shek came across as forcefully anti communist his preference for hierarchical structures and seeming relative unconcern for non soldiers left most American visitors with a less positive impression When the war ended uickly than either Mao or Chiang thought likely the United States tried to arbitrate some form of workable compromise between Chiang and Mao in order to avoid the continued disruption that a civil war would bring However their differences in vision for the future of China were so vast that this effort was doomed from the beginning America’s right wing seized upon Mao’s subseuent triumph in 1949 as evidence of how the “liberals” in Washington had “lost” China as if China belonged to anyone other than the Chinese people That charge was part and parcel of a right wing resurgence in America fueled both by the soon to emerge Korean conflict and the irresponsible charges of widespread communist infiltration throughout all levels of American government by Wisconsin’s Senator McCarthy whose witch hunts dressed up as congressional hearings were telecast nation wide This ugly period within the United States helped further poison relations with China for decades In fact it was only after the Republican President Nixon’s remarkable decision to visit China in the ‘70s – and his gracious reception by the Chinese leadership on that occasion – that matters slowly began to turn back toward a hopeful direction In these opening decades of the 21st Century where China is clearly destined to be the eual of the United States in economic and military power we must wonder Are we doomed to continually replay the missteps of the past? Or are both sides capable of freeing themselves from the ideological shackles that distort what is possible while also masking new opportunities? Right wing forces in the United States continue to argue that China “cannot be trusted” for they believe that is the nature of communistic and single party states to be a danger to “free” societies In their opinion the US posture toward China should be similar to that adopted by this country towards Soviet Russia in the years following the Cold War in which we sought to encircle the Soviet Union with commercial and military alliances which would stay its possible aggression against its neighbors The errors behind such arguments are many American leadership failed from the beginning to recognize that one of the primary reasons Stalin was trying to erect his own network of friendly states was in order to reduce the likelihood of yet another invasion of Russia from the West He remembered although it seems that many in the West did not that it was Russia who had been invaded by the French in 1812 and by the Germans in 1941 Further Stalin recalled the intervention by several Western powers in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 when the West sought to assist the “Whites” in their struggle against the “Red” armies as that revolution played out In many ways China’s current position is similar to the situation facing my own young country in the early 19th century growing in both self confidence and power yet aware of the historically unfriendly – even hostile – posture of existing powers Western and Asian and seeking to demonstrate its earned right to be treated as an eual among nations If only the United States would recognize this opportunity to create a true partnership with China – one obviously based first and foremost upon eual respect and working towards a relationship of mutual trust and inter reliance – there is every likelihood that these two countries could work together to create and maintain the conditions for peace and stability in Asia and elsewhere The challenge is probably eually great for both countries As the established superpower I think it only proper that the United States be the first to offer a genuine hand of friendship Suspicion and distrust will likely linger for some time but the Chinese American communication and cooperation spreads at all levels – between governments and military of course but

Ebook ↠ Chinas War with Japan 1937 1945 å Rana Mitter

In Rana Mitter's tense moving and hugely important book the war between China and Japan one of the most important struggles of the Second World War at last gets the masterly history it deservesDifferent countries give different opening dates for the period of the Second World War but perhaps the most compelling is 1937 when the 'Marc A solid overview of the War of Resistance Ritter argues convincingly on why the Chinese Japanese deserves to be better known in the West but his exclusive attention to politics with no room to discuss battles or armies fails to hold my attentionif it's any comfort to Ritter's effort I already fully acknowledged the significance of 1931 1945 for the modern People's Republic of China

Rana Mitter å Chinas War with Japan 1937 1945 Reader

Chinas War with Japan 1937 1945O Polo Bridge Incident' plunged China and Japan into a conflict of extraordinary duration and ferocity a war which would result in many millions of deaths and completely reshape East Asia in ways which we continue to confront today With great vividness and narrative drive Rana Mitter's new book draws on a huge range of new sources to This book provides an overview of China's pivotal role in WWII and to the extent that readers are unfamiliar with that history it is a useful corrective But its true aims lie deeper it is unapologetically a revisionist history designed to rehabilitate the image of Chiang Kai shek and emphasize the role of the Nationalists in resisting the Japanese invasion In doing so the author also makes clear the relatively small contributions of the Communist forces and goes to great lengths to critiue the actions of Joseph Stilwell the Allies' representative in China and a constant irritant to Chiang In the latter respect the book feels like a response to Barbara Tuchman's Stillwell and the American Experience in China a generally well regarded pro Stilwell biography that did much to lock in the unflattering image of Chiang for Western observers While I enjoyed the book as a condensed review of China's role in the Second World War I felt that the author overreached in his goals I will say I gained a greater appreciation of the sacrifices by the Nationalist forces From this book it would seem that the Communists spent most of their energies regrouping during the war and positioning themselves for the inevitable power struggle to come a charge often aimed at the Nationalists The book also offers insights into some of the thinking of the Chinese participants in the collaboration government with the Japanese However I still harbor doubts about the uality of Chiang's leadership While he may have been the only person able to hold together China's fragile coalition of warlords emerging business class and factional armed forces his political instincts appear to be his primary strength Forgotten Ally is still left to wrestle with his disastrous tactical decisions most glaringly breaching a dike to slow the Japanese army which resulted in the death of up to a half million people and likely only slightly delayed the army's march and the intentional burning of the city Changsha by retreating Nationalists although the Japanese wouldn't reach the city for years The book also acknowledges the endemic corruption that plagued the government and the failure of the Nationalists to adeuately address a devastating famine in one province that ultimately killed millions In passing the book acknowledges that during the civil war with the Communists Chiang was unable to achieve any notable military victories and severely misjudged the strength of his opposition a concession that seems to me to cast doubt on his abilities as a military leader Indeed the only Nationalist military victories against the Japanese proved fleeting Chiang's greatest asset may simply have been his stubborn resolve Moreover the extensive portions of the book focused on J Stilwell struck me as unjustifiably harsh The author lambastes Stilwell for abandoning Chinese troops as part of a failed campaign in Burma despite according to Tuchman's book that he did so under direct orders And the book ignores the fact that Stilwell remained in the area to ensure that retreating armies were supplied with rice and refused air transport in order to stay with 100 military and civilian refugees on a perilous march to safety Tuchman's book also provides needed context for Stilwell's defeat in which he was frustrated by fickle British support and reluctant Chinese participation Tuchman unuestionably had an anti Chiang bias As one point she notes that he had a dictator's instinct for balconies Forgotten Ally returns the favor for Stilwell after the defeat in Burma Stilwell told the press that they had taken a hell of a beating Yet the book leads in to that uote with the statement that Stilwell was never one to miss the opportunity for good press a peculiar jab given his unflattering candor While I have not gone back to Tuchman's book to review all of the points raised against Stilwell the description of the initial Burma defeat did much in my mind to cast doubt on Forgotten Ally's objectivity Ultimately I was not fully convinced by Forgotten Ally While Tuchman's book needs balance to fully credit the Nationalist's contributions I don't think that Forgotten Ally should be read in isolation Still the Japanese aggression in Asia the Allies' shabby treatment of China during the war and the Nationalist's resistance are all critical for understanding China today and it is good that this book provides additional information on each